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Introduction
It has been said many times that verifying cryptographic protocols is important. One popular kind of model is that of Dolev and Yao (after Dolev and Yao (1983) , see Comon and Shmatikov (2002) for a survey), where: the intruder can read and write on every communication channel, and in effect has full control over the network; the intruder may encrypt, decrypt, build and destruct pairs, as many times as it wishes; and, finally, cryptographic means are assumed to be perfect. The latter in particular means that the only way to compute the plaintext M from the ciphertext {M } K is to decrypt the latter using the inverse key K −1
. It also means that no ciphertext can be confused with any message that is not a ciphertext, and that
Thus, messages can be simply encoded as first-order terms, a fact which has been used by many authors; no algebraic law, except the trivial one M = M , holds on messages.
While this is a fine assumption if one uses encryption algorithms such as DES, RC5 or IDEA for example, modular exponentiation and elliptic curve group operations definitely obey non-trivial algebraic laws. In this paper, we are specially interested in modeling Diffie-Hellman primitives (Diffie and Hellman, 1976) . While these are usually implemented through modular exponentiation, the general framework can be described by the use of one unary function e and an associative-commutative (AC), or even an Abelian group law ⊕ (GoubaultLarrecq and Verma, 2002; Verma, 2003a ) with unit 0. For example, the original Diffie-Hellman protocol for establishing a common secret key between two principals A and B has A send the message e(N a ) to B, where N a is a nonce (implemented as a fresh, random number) created by A, then B send the message e(N b ) to A, where N b is another nonce created by B. Assuming that, once you know e(M ) and M ′ , you may deduce e(M ⊕ M ′ ), both A and B can build the common secret key e(N a ⊕ N b ). The standard implementation is by using numbers in Z/pZ M ′ ) should be considered as equal to e(M ′ ⊕ M ), otherwise the Diffie-Hellman protocol just does not work. In IKA.1, not just commutativity, but also associativity is required for the protocol to work as intended. This calls for a modification of the Dolev-Yao model, where messages are taken to be terms modulo an equational theory: here, the theory ACU of associativity, commutativity and unit 0 of ⊕; and, to be more faithful to implementations based on Abelian groups such as Z/pZ * , the richer theory of Abelian groups.
It has been shown in Goubault-Larrecq and Verma (2002) and in the third author's PhD thesis (Verma, 2003a) how special formats of first-order Horn clauses modulo ACU could be put to good use to describe faithfully the IKA.1 protocol. These formats can be seen as extensions of tree automata (Comon et al., 1997) to both so-called two-way tree automata and equational theories. We recap the third author's encoding of IKA.1 for a given number of principals in Section 3. In Section 5, we shall also give a sound abstraction of IKA.1 for arbitrarily many principals, and we shall show that it is secure in the so-called pure eavesdropper security model. (It is well-known that IKA.1 is insecure in the other models we shall consider here, see Millen and Denker (2002) .)
The point is that we establish these results by an automated method: once the clauses describing the protocol have been written, the security of the protocol, which reduces to showing that the given set of clauses is satisfiable, is shown automatically by the MOP tool, due to the second author (Roger, 2003) . In principle, the decidability results of Verma (2003a) could be used to this end, but the complexity of the corresponding algorithms are not primitive recursive; Verma (2003c) 's algorithms are more efficient (elementary) and may provide a basis for an exact verification method. In this paper, we present an approximate resolution technique that works in exponential time, and was fast enough in practice. This technique is described in Section 4, which is the technical core of the paper.
Finally, these techniques are general enough to establish the satisfiability of fairly general clause sets modulo AC, the theory of one associative-commutative symbol, and other theories. This may be of interest in other fields, too.
Outline. We first review related work in Section 2. We recapitulate the third author's encoding of the IKA.1 protocol in Section 3. This will give the reader a hint of the kind of clauses that we need to handle. Section 4 describes a conservative approximation procedure to solve such clause sets. This is based on resolution techniques (Bachmair and Ganzinger, 2001) , plus a technical result that allows one to replace full subderivations by calls to a specialized oracle. Although implementing the corresponding oracle in the case of the theory AC and extensions may seem a challenge, we show how it can be implemented efficiently using counting mechanisms in Section 4.6. This has been implemented in the MOP prover, a modular platform for implementing resolution provers on general algebras, including algebras of terms modulothe answer is false, then we cannot conclude. This is in the spirit of abstract interpretation (see Cousot and Cousot (1992) for a nice introduction). Accordingly, the complexity of our procedure is lower (exponential time, still), and has been implemented by the second author. We won't report on experience with exclusive or here, just because we didn't conduct any experiment on this theory. It should be clear that our techniques apply to the case of exclusive or as well, and on other theories, too.
We shall report on results we obtained with the group key exchange protocol IKA.1 (Steiner et al., 2000) . This protocol, and several others related to it, were scrutinized already by Pereira and Quisquater (2001) . Their conclusions agree with ours. However, past experience has shown that verifying protocols by hand, even when proofs have been published in refereed conferences, is not enough. The most striking example is, of course, the (in)famous NeedhamSchroeder public-key protocol (Needham and Schroeder, 1978) , which was only found vulnerable, using formal methods, 17 years later (Lowe, 1996) .
Since the work of Goubault-Larrecq and Verma (2002) , several authors have proposed formal models of the Diffie-Hellman primitive. As indicated in the introduction, our model is abstract, and is based on a unary function e, a binary associative-commutative operation ⊕, with unit 0. The work of Chevalier et al. (2003) is based on a more precise model, as they use a binary function Exp instead of our unary e. Exp(M, N ) is meant to denote M to the exponent N , so our e(N ) can be seen as Exp(g, N ) for a fixed generator g. This is apparently richer, but no equation is included that relates applications of Exp to different generators. In particular, the equation Exp(g, N ) ⊕ Exp(g ′ , N ) = Exp(g ⊕ g ′ , N ) is not considered (remember that in the implementation of Diffie-Hellman using modular exponentiation, ⊕ is multiplication). If a fixed generator g is used throughout, then we believe that their model and ours are equivalent. The only difference would be that, whereas Chevalier et al. reason modulo the equation Exp(g, M ⊕ N ) = Exp (Exp(g, M ) , N ), we dispense with it and replace it by a deduction rule stating that, once you know e(M ) and N , then you know e(M ⊕ N ). Replacing certain equations by deduction rules was explicitly used in Blanchet (2001) , typically for equations of the form decrypt(encrypt(M, K), K −1 ) = M . This trick is already the basis of all equational reasoning in NRL (Meadows, 1996) . We shall call this the Meadows trick. As noticed e.g. in Kapur et al. (2003) , while this works for some equational theories, this definitely fails with associativity and commutativity.
By far the most faithful model of modular exponentiation today is the E ′ 3,5 model of Kapur et al. (2003) , which includes all of Chevalier et al.'s equations, plus others, including the above formula
. To be precise, Kapur et al. use two distinct symbols, · and •, for multiplication outside of exponents, and inside exponents respectively, which need not be related; · is an Abelian group law, while • is a commutative monoid law. Several restrictions, all extending Chevalier et al.'s model and ours, are shown to give rise to a decidable unification problem, using extensions of Gröbner basis techniques. This entails that reachability properties (e.g., secrecy) are decidable in this model, since resolution then terminates provided only non-looping protocols with only finitely many sessions are considered. Chevalier et al. (2003) shows that the problem (in their slightly more restricted model) is even NP-complete in this case. We are not aware of any implementation of Chevalier et al.'s technique; while they claim that their procedure will find the known attack on IKA.1, no evidence is given that this was obtained by running any actual program.
One may think of models that would be even more faithful to modular exponentiation. We may consider the equation , N ; all this can be used by an intruder, if only to get one bit of information on the plaintext M in the latter case (Goldwasser and Bellare, 1999) . We must stop this inflation at some point. The theories in Kapur et al. (2003) , at the frontier of decidability and undecidability, seem to be a natural limit. However, our techniques are not limited by this fact, since we use approximations anyway. . . and will never need to unify any term modulo the given theory. (We only use unification as a tool in proving completeness.)
Resolution.
We shall make extensive use of resolution theorem proving techniques (Robinson and Voronkov, 2001) . Using resolution to decide subclasses of first-order logic formulas was pioneered by Joyner Jr. (1976) , and earlier by Maslov, see (Fermüller et al., 2001) . Standard refinements of resolution used in this area are hyperresolution and ordered resolution. We shall use ordered resolution with selection (Bachmair and Ganzinger, 2001) . Previous work on cryptographic protocol verification using this rule include Comon-Lundh and Cortier (2003) , and mostly Blanchet (2001) , where it is used as a preprocessing step.
Let us give definitions. Let ≻ be a strict stable ordering on atomic formulas. By stable we mean that if P (s) ≻ Q(t), then P (sσ) ≻ Q(tσ) for any substitution σ, where tσ denotes the application of σ to the term t. (Wlog, we restrict to unary predicate symbols.) A literal is either a positive literal +P (t), or a negative literal −P (t). A clause is a disjunction of literals ± 1 P 1 (t 1 )∨± 2 P 2 (t 2 )∨ . . .∨± k P k (t k ). A Horn clause is one containing at most one literal: we also write P (t) ⇐ P 1 (t 1 ), . . . , P n (t n ) for the definite clause +P (t)∨−P 1 (t 1 ), . . . , −P n (t n ), and ⊥ ⇐ P 1 (t 1 ), . . . , P n (t n ) for the goal clause −P 1 (t 1 ), . . . , −P n (t n ). Let sel be a function mapping each clause to a subset of its negative literals.
Ordered resolution with
selection is the rule that allows one to derive the conclusion (below the bar) provided we have already derived the premises (above), where:
, σ is the most general unifier (mgu) of the equations A 11 . = . . .
For additional definitions, see (Bachmair and Ganzinger, 2001) . It is implicit in the rule above that all premises have been renamed so that no two premises share any free variable. The right premise is called the main premise, all others are side premises. The conclusion is often called a resolvent of the premises.
In the case of Horn clauses, this simplifies to the rule:
where H, H 1 , . . . , H n are bodies, i.e., sets of atomic formulas, comma denotes union of such sets, and the following conditions are met:
This rule is sound , i.e., every conclusion is a consequence of the premises; in particular, if the empty clause ⊥ is derivable from a given set of clauses S, then S is unsatisfiable. It is also complete: if S is unsatisfiable, then one can derive ⊥ from S in finitely many steps of ordered resolution with selection.
It is folklore that soundness and completeness still hold when terms are taken modulo some equational theory E, provided σ is taken to be any member of a complete set of unifiers (csu) csu (A 1 .
, and ≻ is compatible with E, meaning that if s 1 , s 2 are equal mod E, if t 1 , t 2 are equal mod E, and s 1 ≻ t 1 then s 2 ≻ t 2 . This was already the case for other refinements of resolution (Plotkin, 1972) . Such a csu always exists, but needs not be finite or even computable. One can compute a finite one for the theory of associativity and commutativity (AC), resp. with unit (ACU) (Stickel, 1981; Fagès, 1984) .
Independently of equational reasoning, soundness and completeness are preserved when tautologies and various forms of subsumed clauses are removed, at any moment (preferably at the earliest) (Bachmair and Ganzinger, 2001 ). More importantly for making resolution terminate, we shall use rules of splitting. A clause of the form C ∨ C ′ , where C and C ′ are non-empty clauses that share no free variable, is called splittable. Given a set of clauses S ∪ {C ∨ C ′ }, where C ∨C ′ is splittable, the standard version of splitting (Weidenbach, 2001) then considers showing that both S ∪ {C} and S ∪ {C ′ } are unsatisfiable to conclude that S ∪ {C ∨ C ′ } is. Each resulting clause set is called a branch. (Resolution with splitting is then indeed a form of tableaux.) For example, consider the following set of clauses:
When the two clauses (a) and (b) are resolved on P (f (x, y)), we generate the clause Q 1 (x) ⇐ P 1 (x), P 2 (y), Q 2 (y), which is a splittable disjunction. The current branch then splits in two branches, on which reasoning proceeds independently:
Splitting may be applied at any time without breaking soundness or completeness. Because this makes our proofs slightly easier, we shall use Riazanov and Voronkov's special brand of splitting (Riazanov and Voronkov, 2001; Voronkov, 2001) . We make it precise below, and call it splittingless splitting to distinguish it from ordinary splitting. The idea is that when C ∨ C ′ is splittable, then it is equivalent to ∃q · (q ⇒ C) ∧ (¬q ⇒ C ′ ), where q is a fresh propositional symbol.
We make this formal as follows (Roger, 2003 ; Goubault- , 2003) . We first define formally what it means to create fresh propositional symbols. Fix a set P of predicate symbols. A P-clause is any clause whose predicate symbols are all from P. These will be our ordinary clauses. Let then Q be some set of zero-ary predicate symbols disjoint from P, in one-to-one correspondence with the set of P-clauses modulo renaming: for each P-clause C, let C be a symbol in Q, so that C = C ′ iff there is a renaming ̺ such that C = C ′ ̺. These will be our fresh symbols; however notice that we allow ourselves to reuse to same symbol q = C ′ when we meet the same clause C ′ twice. The rule of splittingless splitting is shown on the right, where C and C ′ are two non-empty subclauses sharing no variable, where C ′ is restricted to be a P-clause, and C is required to contain at least an atom P (t) with P ∈ P.
The effect of the rule is to replace C ∨ C ′ by the two clauses C ∨ − C
is a propositional symbol that abbreviates the negation of C ′ , i.e., that is false exactly when C ′ is valid. For example, the clause set (a)-(h) above generates the following clauses, when using resolution and splittingless splitting:
where q = ⊥ ⇐ P 2 (y), Q 2 (y) . Note that steps (k ′ )-(q ′ ) simulate exactly the right branch (k)-(q) of the tableau presented above, and the steps following (j ′′ ) simulate the left branch (as claimed by Voronkov (2001) ).
Ordered resolution with selection, using E-unification, is sound and complete, even when splittingless splitting is applied eagerly (i.e., when both rules can be applied, apply splittingless splitting), provided ≻ is a stable ordering such that P (t) ≻ q for every P ∈ P, q ∈ Q. (We say that ≻ is admissible.)
Proofs are omitted because these results can hardly be doubted, and for lack of space. See Goubault-Larrecq (2003) for a proof in the non-equational case (when E is the empty theory), and Roger (2003) for a proof in a more general case, including all equational theories.
In the sequel, we shall always use a special form of splittingless splitting, which we call ǫ-splitting: this is the special case where C ′ is a negative block −P 1 (x)∨ . . . ∨ −P n (x) (n ≥ 1; the variable x is the same in each literal), and where C ∨ C ′ is Horn. This is the brand of splitting we used in the example above. The ǫ-splitting rule can be reexplained as the one that replaces any clause A ⇐ H, P 1 (x), . . . , P n (x), where x is not free in A or H, by the two clauses A ⇐ H, q and q ⇐ P 1 (x), . . . , P n (x), where q = −P 1 (x) ∨ . . . ∨ −P n (x) ; in effect, this defines q as being true if and only if there is a term satisfying all of P 1 , . . . , P n in the least Herbrand model (if any exists). Consider the initial key agreement protocol IKA.1 (Steiner et al., 2000) (formerly known as GDH.2), used to create an initial group key in the CLIQUES protocol suite. The goal is for a group of principals M 1 , . . . , M k to obtain a common key that they can use for further communication. This key should be unavailable to external eavesdroppers. (An eavesdropper is an intruder who may only listen to communication channels, but not forge messages, remove messages or redirect channels.) Moreover, no principal should be able to decide of the value of the key for the others; in general, no proper subset of the principals should be able to collude to create the common key.
We study the IKA.1 protocol in particular because it has attracted some attention recently. IKA.1 is based on a Diffie-Hellman scheme (Diffie and Hellman, 1976) , which works as follows. We take the standpoint of a Dolev-Yao-like model (Dolev and Yao, 1983) , where terms-here, modulo AC-are used to denote messages. As in the introduction, let e be a unary function symbol, and ⊕ a binary, associative and commutative symbol, and let 0 be a constant. Technically, we should impose that 0 is a unit for ⊕, but our techniques to come would not adapt right away; we shall get around this by using the Meadows trick, partially. Let also cons be a binary function, and nil be a constant, used to represent lists. We shall also use other constants, to be introduced later.
For simplicity, assume we have 3 members in the group, M 1 , M 2 , M 3 . First, IKA.1 starts with a so-called upflow phase: M 1 sends M 2 the message e(N 1 ), where N 1 is a fresh nonce; N 1 is modeled, as usual (Monniaux, 1999) , as a new constant. Then M 2 sends e(N 2 ); e(N 1 ); e(N 1 ⊕ N 2 ) to M 3 , where N 2 is another fresh nonce (modeled as another new constant N 2 = N 1 ). This is possible due to our assumptions that anybody can build e(M ) from M and
Once this is done, M 3 starts the downflow phase, and broadcasts e(N 2 ⊕ N 3 ); e(N 1 ⊕ N 3 ), from which all members can compute the group key e(N 1 ⊕ N 2 ⊕ N 3 ). (N 3 is a third fresh nonce created by M 3 .)
We shall assume in the following discussion that each participant M i (i ≥ 2) checks whether the list of messages it got from M i−1 in the upflow phase contains the trivial message e(0), and if so, refuses to proceed. Otherwise, M 2 could be caught receiving e(0) just to send back e(N 2 ); e(0); e(0 ⊕ N 2 ), that is, e(N 2 ); e(0); e(N 2 ) modulo ACU. If this were possible, then the protocol would fail, since N 1 would be lost in the process, hence the group key would be computed independently of N 1 . This is a perfectly reasonable assumption in practice: any serious implementation of IKA.1 will include similar checks. This will also allow us to use clauses modulo AC instead of modulo ACU.
Modeling IKA.1 with a Fixed Number of Sessions
All possible interleaved executions of the protocol can be described using Horn clauses modulo AC. Let us write selected clauses from this set.
To model communication, introduce predicates ch C for each configuration C that is reachable in an interleaved run of M 1 , M 2 , M 3 . Here a configuration is a triple of numbers, each one stating which step of the protocol the corresponding principal was stationed at. The formula ch C (M ) is meant to hold if and only if M is a possible message present on some communication channel when in configuration C. We also create distinct predicates I C such that I C (M ) is meant to hold when M is deducible, in a sense inspired by Dolev and Yao (1983) , from all messages present on the communication channels at or before configuration C.
As such, for every reachable configuration C, we generate the clauses:
Intruder knows the empty list (4)
Intruder can read heads (6)
Intruder can read tails (7)
We shall define several intrusion models. This will have an impact on the clauses we shall generate to define ch C . Whatever the model, we shall generate the clauses
Intruder remembers past messages (9) for any reachable configuration C, and where C ′ is the predecessor of C (if any) in (9).
The most benign model from a security viewpoint is the pure eavesdropper model, where the intruder does not interfere with communication, except for remembering all messages exchanged by the honest principals M i . If M i sends M under some conditions H, then we generate the clause ch C (M ) ⇐ H. If M i waits for some message M to be read before doing some action described by a clause A ⇐ H, then we generate A ⇐ H, ch C (M ). (This will be described in more detail below.) In the pure eavesdropper model, this will be all.
In the copycat model, the intruder is also able to replay old messages, and to divert communication channels. We generate the additional clause
for any reachable configuration C with predecessor C ′ . This specifies that every message put on some channel remains on this channel, and can be read at any time in the future, and replayed as many times as we wish.
In the Dolev-Yao model, so named because it is closest to that of Dolev and Yao (1983) , instead of (10), we generate the clause ch C (x) ⇐ I C (x) Intruder has complete control over channels (11) In other words, anything read from any channel is directly forged by the intruder from past messages. As far as security is concerned, this is the model giving the most abilities to the intruder. Any attack in all previous models can be played in this model.
The final required ingredient is the specification of the contents of the communication channels in the initial configuration C 0 : we assume that some predicate ch C 0 has been defined by some set of Horn clauses. We further restrict the pure eavesdropper model to be such that the channel is empty in configuration C 0 : just don't produce any clause defining ch C 0 .
Starting from C 0 , execution may proceed by letting M 1 send its upflow message to M 2 , letting the whole system progress to some new configuration C 1 (and C 0 is its predecessor):
Note that ch C 1 holds of exactly one message in the pure eavesdropper model. This will be an invariant of our description: for any reachable configuration C, there will be at most one ground term M such that ch C (M ) holds-the contents of the channel. In the copycat and Dolev-Yao models, ch C (M ) may be true for several messages M , because of clauses (10), resp. (11).
Let us write what happens if M 2 runs next, sending its own message to M 3 :
Clause (13) means that M 2 reads the message from M 1 first; this should be e(N 1 ), but M 2 can only check that it is e(x) for some x; also, the only way it can get e(x) is by querying the channel through ch C 1 . Then M 2 should build e(N 2 ); e(N 1 ); e(N 1 ⊕ N 2 ). Since the variable x should contain N 1 , actual implementations build e(N 2 ); e(x); e(x ⊕ N 2 ), and send it to the intruder in the new configuration C 2 . (Note that this clause does not represent the case where the x received is 0; in this case, we should either switch to the theory ACU, or generate the additional clause ch C 2 (e(N 2 ); e(0); e(N 2 )) ⇐ ch C 1 (e(x)).
As we said earlier, we assume that the implementation checks that x is not 0, which dispenses us from doing either.)
The downflow message from M 3 gives rise to the clause:
Now the secrecy requirement on, say, M 1 's view of the group key is that
Indeed, M 1 's view of the group key is e(x ⊕ N 1 ), where the message broadcasted by M 3 is e(x); y, i.e., where ch C 3 (e(x); y) holds (reminder: if this message is not forged, then x = N 2 ⊕ N 3 ). Clause (15) states that this view e(x ⊕ N 1 ) is not known to the intruder in configuration C 3 (and therefore neither in C 1 or C 2 .)
There are many other possible interleavings, whose description we leave to the reader. The important point is that, if there is an attack, then the resulting set of clauses S 0 will be unsatisfiable: an attack will provide a derivation of ⊥. Hence, if S 0 is satisfiable, then the protocol is secure. This observation is due to Selinger (2001) in the non-equational case.
Transformations of Clauses
It will be useful in the sequel to work on restricted forms of clauses. The main reason is that the satisfiability of general clause formats is undecidable, but some transformations can be used to convert clauses to a decidable format, possibly losing some information. The prototype of this is given by Früh-wirth et al. (1991) . We describe a very similar transformation, inspired from Goubault-Larrecq (2002a).
The main transformation we use is flattening. The purpose of flattening is to transform the input clause set S 0 into a set of so-called flat clauses S 1 , in which all predicate symbols are applied either to variables or to flat terms f (x 1 , . . . , x n ), where f is a function symbol and x 1 , . . . , x n are variables.
Let S be a set of clauses. If there is a clause C = C 0 ∨ ±P (t) in S where t is neither a variable nor a flat term, i.e., t = f (t 1 , . . . , t n ), then:
(1) If ± is −, create n fresh predicate symbols P j , 1 ≤ j ≤ n, and replace C in S by the n + 1 clauses:
where X 1 , . . . , X n are fresh variables, not necessarily distinct, but such that
2) If ± is +, create n fresh predicate symbols P j , 1 ≤ j ≤ n, and replace C in S by the n + 1 clauses:
is obtained by such a transformation. It is easy to see that ; terminates: let |t| be the size of term t, i.e., |x| = 0 for every variable x, |f (t 1 , . . . , t n )| = 1 + |t 1 | + . . . + |t n |, and the size of the clause is satisfiable, then so will be S. In particular, letting S 1 be any ;-normal form of S 0 , if S 1 is satisfiable, then S 0 will be too, and the protocol will be secure. In general, the converse is wrong, so this is an abstraction. It turns out that, in the case of the clauses of Section 3.2, this abstraction is exact in all three models (pure eavesdropper, copycat, Dolev-Yao): see Section 3.4.
A slight optimization of flattening in the presence of an AC symbol ⊕ is to modify the definition of flat terms so that any sum of variables x 1 ⊕x 2 ⊕. . .⊕x n is considered a flat term.
We may extend flattening so as to apply the transformation rules (1) and (2) above even when t is of the form f (x 1 , . . . , x n ) where x 1 , . . . , x n are variables, provided some additional conditions are met. (Otherwise, the procedure would loop on clauses of the form (17) 
and (19).)
One typical case is when the rest C 0 of the clause contains another literal ±P ′ (g(y 1 , . . . , y m )) where the set {y 1 , . . . , y m } of variables is different from {x 1 , . . . , x n } but {y 1 , . . . , y m } ∩ {x 1 , . . . , x n } = ∅, or when f = g. Normalizing clauses with this relaxed definition of flattening ensures that the resulting clauses are either blocks, i.e., clauses of the form ± 1 P 1 (x) ∨ . . . ∨ ± n P n (x) (for the same variable x; we abbreviate such blocks B(x)); or complex clauses (in the terminology of Goubault-Larrecq (2002a)), i.e., clauses of the form
, where B 1 , . . . , B n are blocks and m ≥ 1 (with the same f and the same set of variables x 1 , . . . , x n as arguments of f ); or disjunctions of such clauses, not sharing any free variable. When B(x) is a negative block −P 1 (x) ∨ . . . ∨ −P n (x), we shall write −B(x) for the set P 1 (x), . . . , P n (x) on the right of ⇐ in Horn clauses.
Blocks and complex clauses correspond exactly to a format of positive set constraints, with equality constraints between brothers, when reasoning modulo the empty theory; Goubault-Larrecq (2002a) uses this observation to generalize positive set constraints to higher-order terms. That set constraints correspond to a decidable class of first-order formulas, namely the monadic class, was observed by Bachmair et al. (1993) .
Sets of flattened Horn clauses modulo E are, up to small variations, the alternating two-way tree automata modulo E of Verma (2003c,b) . We shall call them automata clauses for short. In other words, automata clauses are comprised of blocks and complex clauses.
The satisfiability of alternating two-way tree automata modulo AC is undecidable, but dropping alternation allows one to regain decidability, with non-primitive complexity in the AC case (Verma, 2003a) . We use flattened Horn clauses in this paper simply because these are the cases on which the techniques of Section 4 work.
Flattening the IKA.1 Clauses
All clauses of Section 3.2 but a few are automata clauses. E.g., clauses (1), (2), (4), (5), (6), (7), (8), (9), (10), and (11) are automata clauses.
The remaining ones can be rewritten in the form of automata clauses by introducing auxiliary predicate symbols, that is, by flattening. Clause (3) is flattened to:
where Q C and Q ′ C are fresh. Note that we do not lose any information here: the clauses above state exactly the same thing as I C (e(x ⊕ y)) ⇐ I C (e(x)), I C (y), provided we define Q C so that Q C holds of every term t such that I C (e(t)) holds, and Q ′ C holds of every sum of terms t and t ′ such that t satisfies Q C and t
A similar observation holds of clauses (12) and (15). We can flatten the latter as
are fresh. There are other flattenings. We choose this one because it avoids generating so-called intersection (a.k.a., alternation) clauses, of the form P (x) ⇐ Q(x), Q ′ (x). This would be important if we were to use Verma (2003a)'s techniques, as this shows that we do not need alternation, a cause of undecidability, for this clause.
The only clauses where flattening is approximate are (13) and (14). The clauses
are equivalent to (13) in the Dolev-Yao model, in the copycat model (where sending lists of elements or sending each element separately has the same net effect) and in the pure eavesdropper model (where any ch C recognizes at most one value anyway). These can be converted to automata clauses:
where all newly introduced predicates are fresh. By a similar argument clause (14) can be converted to automata clauses:
Apart from giving an illustration of flattening, this section is meant to show that the IKA.1 protocol with finitely many principals can be encoded exactly in the decidable fragment of sets of automata clauses modulo AC without alternation. While we won't make any use of this observation here, since we rely on approximate techniques anyway, it may be useful in further exact treatments of IKA.1.
Deciding Sets of Horn Clauses Modulo AC with Resolution

Preliminaries: Deciding the Non-Equational Case by Resolution
To decide sets of automata clauses, we use ordered resolution with selection, eager ǫ-splitting, and elimination of tautologies and forward subsumed clauses. To see why this is interesting, let us explain why this strategy decides the satisfiability of any finite set of automata clauses modulo the empty theory; we shall deal with the AC case later. Note that this satisfiability problem is exactly the satisfiability problem of definite positive set constraints with equality tests between brothers, see Goubault-Larrecq (2002a) for details. (The more general case of non-definite positive set constraints, i.e., the case of possibly non-Horn flattened clauses can also be handled this way.)
Choose the ordering ≻ so that P (t) ≻ q for every P ∈ P and q ∈ Q, and P (t) ≻ P ′ (t ′ ) whenever t is a strict superterm of t ′ , whatever P, P ′ ∈ P are. This is a stable ordering, hence an admissible ordering, so ordered resolution with selection is sound and complete if we use this ordering.
To make resolution terminate, define the selection function sel 0 as follows:
• if C contains a negative literal −q with q ∈ Q, then sel 0 (C) = {−q}; • otherwise, let max(C) be the set of maximal literals in C for ≻, then define sel 0 (C) as the subset of those negative literals in max(C).
For example, in clause (a) in the example of Section 2.2, namely P (f (x, y)) ⇐ P 1 (x), P 2 (y), there is no negative literal −q, so apply the second item. The only maximal literal is +P (f (x, y)), and it is positive. So no literal is selected in this clause. By condition (iii) of the definition, this clause can be used as main premise; by condition (iv), it cannot be used as side premise. In clause (b) Q 1 (x) ⇐ P (f (x, y)), Q 2 (y), the only selected literal is −P (f (x, y)). Clause (b) can therefore be used as side premise but not as main premise. So ordered resolution with selection can be used in only one way on clauses (a) and (b),
. Notice that, up to the addition of q literals, the resulting clauses are still automata clauses.
More formally, let Q 0 be the set of all q literals of the form B(x) , where B(x) is any non-empty negative block. Since B(x) is a block, it is a P-clause. If P contains p predicate symbols, then Q 0 contains 2 p − 1 elements.
We claim that, given any finite set S of automatic P-clauses (modulo the empty theory), every clause obtained from S by the above resolution strategy is Horn and of one of the following forms:
(1) a clause C[∨ + q], where C is a block and q ∈ Q 0 (the notation C[∨ + q] meaning a clause of the form C or C ∨ +q); (2) a clause C[∨ + q], where C is a complex P-clause, and q ∈ Q 0 ; (3) or a clause C ∨−q 1 ∨. . .∨−q m [∨+q], where C is a block, q 1 , . . . , q m , q ∈ Q 0 and 1 ≤ m ≤ a, and a is the maximal arity of all function symbols;
Indeed:
• Resolvents of clauses of type (1) are again of type (1).
• Any ordered resolution step with selection between clauses of type (2) must have as premises clauses of the form C ∨ +P (f (x 1 , . . . , x m )) and
either the latter is of type (2) again if there is another literal ±Q(f
(which is of type (3)).
• Any ordered resolution step with selection between a clause of type (1) and a clause of type (2) must be between clauses of the form C ∨ −P (x)[∨ + q] (type (1)) and C ′ ∨ +P (f (x 1 , . . . , x m )) (type (2)), or between clauses C ∨ +P (x) (type (1)) and
in both cases. This is of type (2) if C is non-empty or there is a literal ±Q(f ′ (x 1 , . . . , x m )) in C ′ ; otherwise, this is a disjunction of m blocks (possibly with +q), yielding clauses of type (1) and (3) by ǫ-splitting, as in the previous case.
• Next, the only way we can resolve a type (3) clause with some other clause is to resolve on one of the selected literals −q i , 1 ≤ i ≤ m; this can only be done with a clause C containing +q i , but this is impossible if C is of type (1) or (2) since q i is not maximal in C, unless C is exactly the unit clause +q i , in which case the resolvent is of type (3) or (1); and this is impossible when C is of type (3), since then sel 0 (C) = ∅.
As far as complexity is concerned, a quick computation shows that we generate at most an exponential number of clauses in the number p of predicates and the maximum arity a of functions, and that they have at most exponential size. So this resolution strategy terminates in exponential time. This is easily seen to be optimal: we have retrieved the result that the satisfiability of positive set constraints with equality tests between brothers is DEXPTIME-complete.
Why the AC Case is Harder
Unfortunately, resolving two clauses that use some AC symbol ⊕ generates bigger clauses in general, in such a way that we cannot bound their size.
In particular, imitating the argument of Section 4.1 by trying, say, to restrict to blocks and complex clauses (letting f 1 , . . . , f n be any function symbols, including AC symbols), fails. Consider for example the following clauses
(We have already obtained the second clause by expanding clause (3) in Section 3.4.) One complete set of AC-unifiers of x ′ ⊕ y ′ and x ⊕ y consists of the following 7 substitutions, where x 1 , x 2 , y 1 , y 2 are fresh, pairwise distinct variables:
We then get the following 7 resolvents:
Clauses (2), (4), (6), and (7) split further, yielding
respectively using ǫ-splitting, where q 1 = −Q C (x) , q 2 = −I C (y) . However, clauses (1), (3), and (5) are neither blocks nor complex clauses, because they contain literals whose sets of free variables do not contain all the free variables of the clause; this was an essential condition for decidability in the non-AC case of Section 4.1. It is probably futile to try to allow for more general complex clauses, until we reach a notion that is general enough; resolving these clauses with other clauses only produces larger and larger resolvents, involving larger and larger sums of variables.
Grey Zones, Grey Oracles
Instead, our action plan is as follows. Imagine for the moment that we are using just resolution to decide the satisfiability of automata clauses, modulo AC. Then any proof is a tree whose nodes are labeled by clauses; if resolution is applied to the side premises C 1 , . . . , C n and the main premise C, with conclusion C ′ , then C ′ will label a node whose sons are labeled with C 1 , . . . , C n , C. Splitting would complicate matters quite a lot here. If we overlook the problem with splitting for the moment, and if we ignore the necessity of using q literals, the arguments of Section 4.1 show that, as long as we deal with blocks and complex clauses with only non-equational function symbols (all but ⊕ in our case), only finitely many clauses, either blocks or similar complex clauses, can be produced. As soon as ⊕ comes into play, we may get larger and larger clauses using only ⊕ as function symbol (so-called ⊕-clauses), see Section 4.2. But, if such clauses eventually participate in deriving the empty clause, it must be the case that one ⊕-clause thus derived eventually resolves with other clauses to get a conclusion C that is either directly the empty clause, or can resolve with complex clauses not containing ⊕. Since no term headed by ⊕ unifies with a term headed by f , with f = ⊕, and provided we only unify on maximal atoms, C can only be a disjunction of literals of the form ±P (x), with x a variable. Hence C must split into blocks. This is tentatively pictured in Figure 1 ; the leaves of the derivation (at the top) are clauses in the initial clause set S. Resolution steps inside the white zones are those that we met in Section 4.1, and which must terminate since they only generate finitely many clauses. Resolution steps inside the grey zones produce arbitrarily many, arbitrarily large ⊕-clauses. This leads us to the following idea: instead of applying resolution inside the grey zones, try to guess the fat dots, which are the interface points between grey zones and white zones. Forbid resolution to act on ⊕-clauses (this prevents us from using resolution to derive clauses inside the grey zones), and compensate this by adding a rule that infers the fat dot clauses, at the bottom of grey zones, directly from the clauses at the top of grey zones: this is the oracle rule. At this point, we must admit that this does not seem practical at all; the perspective will gradually improve. Let us only notice however that the fat dots, which are splittable disjunctions of blocks, are only finitely many. Let us just give the idea of a possible oracle. Inside a grey zone, we only have ⊕-clauses. In particular, no symbol other than ⊕ occurs. So all deductions made inside a grey zone are valid in any model of the sole associative-commutative symbol ⊕. E.g., consider Z/nZ, where ⊕ denotes addition modulo n. We then compute all instances of clauses given on entry to the grey zone inside the model; for example, the instances of P (x ⊕ y) ⇐ Q(x), R(y) in Z/2Z are P (0) ⇐ Q(0), R(0); P (1) ⇐ Q(0), R(1); P (1) ⇐ Q(1), R(0); and P (0) ⇐ Q(1), R(1). We then let the oracle simulate resolution at the level of firstorder clauses by computing all resolvents on the instances over M. From time to time, we examine a given inferred instance, and guess which fat dot clause it might be an instance of.
In the following sections, we make the intuition behind Figure 1 formal. Indeed, while we hope that the discussion above conveys the essential ideas, the arguments in this discussion are slightly wrong, and certainly cannot serve as proof. This will require several careful definitions, and gradual modifications to the basic ordered resolution with selection rule before we can state the fundamental oracle lemma. (Please fasten your seat belts: this is definitely technical. We have done our best to make it accessible.)
Scrutinizing the Resolution Rule
It is as easy (or as difficult) to deal with the special case of one ⊕ symbol as to deal with many equational theories at once, so let us introduce the corresponding generalization. Recall that a signature Σ is a set of function symbols, together with their arities. A Σ-term, or equivalently a term on Σ is any term whose function symbols are all taken from Σ. We say that a P-clause is a Σ-clause if and only if it is of the form ± 1 P 1 (t 1 ) ∨ . . . ∨ ± k P k (t k ) where t 1 , . . . , t k are Σ-terms. It is a non-trivial Σ-clause if and only if, additionally, not all of t 1 , . . . , t k are variables. Similarly, an equation s ≈ t is on Σ if and only if s and t are both on Σ. (We use the symbol ≈ for equations to distinguish it from true equality; we assume that s ≈ t and t ≈ s are the same equation.) An equational theory on Σ is a set E of equations on Σ. The notion of an equality s ≈ t provable from E, written E |= s ≈ t is defined as usual, inductively, by the rules E |= s ≈ s (reflexivity), E |= s ≈ t implies E |= t ≈ s (symmetry), E |= s ≈ t and E |= t ≈ u imply E |= s ≈ u (transitivity), E |= sσ ≈ tσ if (s ≈ t) ∈ E for any substitution σ (even mapping variables to terms that are not on Σ, but on a larger signature), and E |= s i ≈ t i , 1 ≤ i ≤ n, together imply E |= f (s 1 , . . . , s n ) ≈ f (t 1 , . . . , t n ) (congruence). For example, let AC be the theory {x ⊕ y ≈ y ⊕ x, (x ⊕ y) ⊕ z ≈ x ⊕ (y ⊕ z)} of associativity and commutativity of ⊕, a theory on the signature {⊕}, then
We say that an equational theory E on Σ is simple if and only if there is a computable strict, stable ordering ≻ E,Σ compatible with E such that f (x 1 , . . . , x n ) ≻ E,Σ x i for every i, 1 ≤ i ≤ n, and every function symbol f (possibly outside Σ), where x 1 , . . . , x n are distinct variables. In other words, ≻ E,Σ is a computable, compatible simplification ordering. AC and the empty theory are simple: take ≻ E,Σ to be defined by s ≻ E,Σ t if and only if |s| > |t|, where |u| denotes the size of term u. ACU = AC ∪ {x ⊕ 0 ≈ x} is not simple.
Note that, assuming there is at least one non-constant function symbol f , any simple equational theory E must be collapse-free, i.e., if E |= s ≈ t, then either s and t are the same variable x, or neither s nor t is a variable. Indeed, assume otherwise: E |= s ≈ x, where x is a variable and s is not. If x is free in s, then s ≻ E,Σ x by simplicity, hence s ≻ E,X s by compatibility, which is impossible. If x is not free in s, then E |= s[x := f (x, . . . , x)] ≈ x[x := f (x, . . . , x)], so since x is not free in s, E |= s ≈ f (x, . . . , x); since f is not constant, f (x, . . . , x) ≻ E,Σ x, so s ≻ E,Σ s by compatibility, a contradiction again.
We shall claim that, given the right ordering and selection function, we can make resolution start from clauses of certain forms, and only generate clauses of the same forms. These forms were the types (1), (2) and (3) in Section 4.1. Here we shall use more general clauses.
Proposition 1 Let Σ 0 , Σ be two disjoint signatures, such that Σ∪Σ 0 contains at least one non-constant function symbol. Assume E is a simple equational theory on Σ, and let ≻ E,Σ be any computable strict, stable ordering ≻ E,Σ compatible with E such that f (x 1 , . . . , x n ) ≻ E,Σ x i for every i, 1 ≤ i ≤ n, for every f ∈ Σ ∪ Σ 0 . Let sel be the following selection function:
• If C is a Horn Σ-clause, possibly in disjunction with +q, q ∈ Q 0 , then:
· If C contains a negative literal −P (t) with t not a variable, then let sel(C) be {−P (t)} (note that the fact that t is not a variable is well-defined modulo E, since E is simple, hence collapse-free); · Otherwise, if C can be written as A ⇐ H, P 1 (x), . . . , P m (x) where x is not free in A or in the body (i.e., conjunction of atoms) H and m ≥ 1 (in other words, if there is a variable x free on the right of ⇐ but not on the left), then let sel(C) be {−P 1 (x), . . . , −P m (x)}. · Otherwise, sel(C) is empty.
• If C is a clause containing no function symbol from Σ, then:
· if C contains a negative literal −q with q ∈ Q, then sel(C) = {−q}; · otherwise, let max(C) be the set of maximal literals in C for ≻, then define sel(C) as the subset of those negative literals in max(C).
For simplicity, say "resolution" for "ordered resolution with selection with ordering ≻ E,Σ and selection function sel".
Given any set S of Horn clauses of one of the following types:
, where C is a block and q ∈ Q 0 ;
, where C is a complex Σ 0 -clause, m ≥ 0, and q 1 , . . . , q m , q ∈ Q 0 ; (6) C[∨ + q], where C is a non-trivial Σ-clause, and q ∈ Q 0 . then any clause obtained from S by resolution and eager ǫ-splitting on clauses not of type (6) is again of one of the types (4), (5), (6).
Note that we restrict ǫ-splitting so as to not split clauses of type (6). This is to avoid problems in the treatment of splitting in Σ-clauses.
PROOF. First, observe that: ( * ) no non-variable Σ 0 -term s = f (s 1 , . . . , s m ) unifies with any non-variable Σ-term t modulo E. Indeed, assume otherwise: E |= sσ ≈ tσ for some substitution σ. Any term equal to s modulo E is of the form f (. . .), with f ∈ Σ 0 , and since Σ is collapse-free, any term equal to tσ modulo E must be of the form g(. . .) with g ∈ Σ. We conclude by observing that f = g, since Σ and Σ 0 are disjoint.
The case of clauses of type (4) and (5) has already been dealt with in Section 4.1, using the same selection function: clauses (4) and (5) resolve together to produce other clauses of type (4) or (5) only, up to ǫ-splitting.
It remains to examine the case where one clause of type (6) is resolved against some other clauses. There are two cases, depending on whether this clause is used as a main clause or as a side clause. Let the main clause be C ∨ −A 1 ∨ . . . ∨ −A m , where −A 1 , . . . , −A m are the literals selected by sel, and let the side clauses be A
• Let us assume some side clause A ′ i ⇐ H i is of type (6). Looking at the definition of sel, and remembering that no literal can be selected in a side clause, we realize that A ′ i ⇐ H i must be of the form
with n i ≥ 2, g i ∈ Σ, and some negative blocks B 1 (x 1 ), . . . , B n i (x n i ), and where x 1 , . . . , x n i are free in g i (t i1 , . . . , t im i ).
This implies that the main clause cannot be of type (5). Assume the contrary. ≻ E,Σ and sel have been set up in such a way that the literals resolved upon, namely A 1 , . . . , A m , would be maximal. Let A i be written P i (t i ), with t i a Σ 0 -term. Observe that t i cannot be a variable, say y: since C ∨ −A 1 ∨ . . . ∨ −A m is of type (5), y would occur free in some non-variable term of the clause, contradicting maximality. So t i is a non-variable Σ 0 -term, hence A i cannot unify with g i (t i1 , . . . , t im i ) modulo E, by ( * ) above.
So the main clause is of type (4) or (6). We claim that no other side clause A ′ j ⇐ H j , j = i, can be of type (5). Indeed, assume otherwise. Since no literal is selected in side clauses, by definition of sel any side clause must contain no −q, q ∈ Q 0 , and the only maximal literal must be positive. So, any type (5) side clause must be of the form
where f ∈ Σ 0 . If the main clause is of type (4), then by definition of sel, the selected literals A 1 , . . . , A m in it are of the form −P 1 (x), . . . , −P m (x) with the same variable x, so x unifies with both g i (t i1 , . . . , t im i ) (ith side clause) and f (t ′ 1 , . . . , t ′ n ′ ) (jth), which is impossible by ( * ). If the main clause is of type (6), notice that sel was defined in such a way that the only possibility that it selects two or more atoms (required for i and j to be distinct) is in the second item of its definition, in which case the selected literals A 1 , . . . , A m are of the form −P 1 (x), . . . , −P m (x) with the same variable x, and the same argument goes through.
Since the main clause and all side clauses are of type (4) or (6), it is clear now that the resolvent is of type (6), if some symbol from Σ remains in it, or that it is a disjunction of blocks (and possibly of some +q, q ∈ Q 0 ), which ǫ-splits into clauses of type (4) or (5).
• Let us assume now that the main clause C ∨ −A 1 ∨ . . . ∨ −A m is of type (6), but no side clause is. We have three cases, corresponding to the three cases defining sel:
, t is not a variable. In particular, t is a term that does not unify with any non-variable Σ 0 -term, by ( * ). In particular the side clause A ′ 1 ⇐ H 1 must be such that A ′ 1 = P (x) for some variable x. Since no literal is selected in a side clause, H 1 contains no q literal, and also no literal that is maximal in A ′ 1 ⇐ H 1 . We then claim that H 1 must be empty. Among all literals in H 1 where x is not free, there must be a maximal one, say −Q(u). Now Q(u) and x must be incomparable wrt. ≻ E,Σ : indeed, if u ≻ E,Σ x, since ≻ E,Σ is stable and x is not free in u, we would have u[x := u] ≻ E,Σ x[x := u], i.e., u ≻ E,Σ u, and similarly if x ≻ E,Σ u. But then Q(u) would be maximal in A ′ 1 ⇐ H 1 , where A ′ 1 = P (x), a contradiction. So all literals in H 1 must contain x free; but since ≻ E,Σ is a simplification ordering, the existence of such a literal in H 1 contradicts the maximality of +P (x). So H 1 is empty. So A ′ 1 ⇐ H 1 is just the clause +P (x), and the resolvent is C, which is of type (6) if C still contains a symbol from Σ, or splits into clauses of type (4) and (5) otherwise.
, and x is not free in C. Let σ be some member of csu ( Remember we have assumed that no side clause was of type (6). So, if some t ′ i is a non-variable Σ-term, then all side clauses are of type (4), and by arguments similar to the previous case (the case m = 1, A 1 = P (t), t not a variable), the generated resolvent is of type (6), or splits into clauses of type (4) and (5).
So we are left with the case where all side clauses are of type (4) or (5). Without loss of generality, assume that the clauses of type (4) among the side clauses are
for some variable y, so by definition of sel, H i must be empty. When k + 1 ≤ i ≤ m, we use the fact that A ′ i ⇐ H i is an automata clause for the first time. This special case of an automata clause with no literal selected must be of the form
where the variables x i1 , . . . , x in are not necessarily distinct, and the B ij (x ij )'s are negative blocks. The symbol f is the same for every i, because all A ′ i s must unify.
In the trivial case where k = m, i.e., when all side clauses are of type (4), the resolvent is of type (6) or splits into clauses of type (4) and (5). The interesting case is when k < m. Then there is a unique most general unifier σ of x, y, and the terms f (x i1 , . . . , x in ), k + 1 ≤ i ≤ m, and σ maps variables to variables. The resolvent is C ∨ m i=k+1 n j=1 B ij (x ij ) σ, which is of type (6) if any symbol from Σ remains, or splits into clauses of type (4) and (5) otherwise. · No literal is selected; by (iv), A 1 , . . . , A m are maximal in C ∨ −A 1 ∨ . . . ∨ −A m . More importantly, since no literal is selected in C ∨−A 1 ∨. . .∨−A m , the definition of sel implies that the only negative literals in this clause are of the form −P (x) with x a variable free at the left of the ⇐ sign, i.e., that this clause is of the form
with g ∈ Σ. But no negative literal is maximal here, contradiction. 2
The proof of Proposition 1 shows that, starting from clauses of type (4), (5), or (6), resolution can be decomposed in two subclasses of the resolution rule: white zone resolution, where the premises are of type (4) or (5), and grey zone resolution, where at least one premise is of type (6). The latter has two variants: light grey resolution is when there is just one other premise, which is of type (4) or (6); dark grey resolution is the one occurring in the next-to-last case of the proof of Proposition 1:
where 0 ≤ k ≤ m − 1, x is not free in C, C is of the form
with g ∈ Σ, and σ is the mgu of x and all f (x i1 , . . . ,
Moreover, as said above, the only places where we get out of the grey zone, i.e. where we derive clauses that are not of type (6) by grey resolution, are when we generate splittable disjunctions of blocks (possibly in disjunction with +q, q ∈ Q 0 ), which get ǫ-split immediately, yielding clauses of type (4) or (5).
Let us abstract whatever may happen inside the grey zone by a unique rule: starting from a set S of clauses of type (4), (5) or (6), we guess which kind of clauses may be the fat dots terminating the grey zones. By the remark above, these fat dots are the candidates:
Definition 2 A candidate is any Horn clause of the form
where the x i s are pairwise distinct, B i (x i ) is a non-empty block for every i, 1 ≤ i ≤ n, and q ∈ Q 0 .
A grey oracle is any function O mapping every set of clauses of type (4), (5), or (6), to a set of candidates containing all those deducible by grey resolution.
Corollary 3 Let O be any grey oracle. Under the assumptions of Proposition 1, white resolution together with the grey oracle rule: to S add O(S), is complete for every set of clauses of type (4), (5), or (6). In other words, for every set S 1 of clauses of type (4), (5), or (6), if S 1 is unsatisfiable modulo E, then the empty clause can be derived from S 1 by white resolution and the grey oracle rule. Moreover, completeness is retained when removing tautologies, forward subsumed clauses, and ǫ-splitting of clauses not of type (6).
Please note that we did not require O to be sound (intuitively, such that only semantically valid consequences modulo E are produced by the oracle). This is not a problem here, since we only want a sufficient criterion for ensuring that S 1 is satisfiable: what we need is that if ⊥ cannot be derived, then S 1 is satisfiable, and this is completeness. We also need O to be computable. We cannot require it to be sound as well, otherwise white resolution and the grey oracle rule would actually decide the class of all sets of clauses of type (4), (5), or (6). Since this class contains the alternating two-way AC-tree automata of Goubault-Larrecq and Verma (2002) , which is undecidable, this is hopeless.
Now finding a grey oracle is hard. In particular, dark grey resolution involves looking at clauses of all three types (4), (5), (6). Remember we would like to find an oracle by just instantiating ⊕ as addition modulo n. This is impossible if clauses of type (6) have to be considered, since we would have to instantiate all function symbols from Σ 0 as well. We therefore strive to find replacement rules that do not need to look at clauses of type (6).
Notice that the conclusion of dark grey resolution, C ∨ m i=k+1 n j=1 B ij (x ij ) σ, is of the form C ∨ B 1 (x 1 ) ∨ . . . ∨ B n (x n ) for some distinct variables x 1 , . . . , x n not free in C and some negative ǫ-blocks B 1 (x 1 ), . . . , B n (x n ). Although this form of splitting was forbidden in Proposition 1, so as to keep some control on the shape of clauses of type (6), we may imagine modifying dark grey resolution to a rule where the conclusion is ǫ-split right away, and the main premise is given in ǫ-split form. Let therefore beige resolution be
with g ∈ Σ, σ is the mgu of x and all f (x i1 , . . . ,
, where x 1 , . . . , x n are distinct variables not free in C, and finally q j = B j (x) . Just like splitting, this rule generates several clauses, n + 1 to be precise.
For this to preserve completeness, we need to allow ǫ-splitting of clauses of type (6), and to introduce the following q-resolution rule:
where C is a non-trivial Σ-clause. Once we do this, dark grey resolution can be simulated by first splitting the main clause C ∨ −P 1 (x) ∨ . . . ∨ −P m (x) into C ∨ −q and +q ∨ −P 1 (x) ∨ . . . ∨ −P m (x), where q = −P 1 (x) ∨ . . . ∨ −P m (x) . Then use beige resolution to derive +q ∨−q 1 ∨. . .∨−q n and q j ∨B j (x), 1 ≤ j ≤ n. By using q-resolution with C ∨ −q, we get back C ∨ −P 1 (x) ∨ . . . ∨ −P m (x), which is the conclusion of rule (DGRes). Since beige resolution is just a special case of white resolution, we conclude:
Proposition 4 Under the assumptions of Proposition 1, the rules of white resolution, light grey resolution, q-resolution and ǫ-splitting are complete.
Unfortunately, Proposition 4 does not state that we may apply ǫ-splitting eagerly, which would be nicer for implementation purposes. This is repaired in the next proposition.
Proposition 5 Let us say that a clause is of type (6') if and only if it is of the form C ∨ −q 1 ∨ . . . ∨ −q m [∨ + q], where C is a non-trivial Σ-clause, and q 1 , . . . , q m , q ∈ Q 0 .
Let ivory resolution be the following modification of light grey resolution:
, or no literal is selected in C ∨ −A and −A is maximal in C ∨ −A; and moreover one of the premises is of type (6'), and the other is of type (4) or (6').
Then, under the assumptions of Proposition 1, the rules of white resolution, ivory resolution, q-resolution and eager ǫ-splitting are complete.
PROOF. Every clause can be written in a unique way C ∨ B 1 (x 1 ) ∨ . . . ∨ B n (x n ), where x 1 , . . . , x n are distinct variables that are not free in C, where B 1 (x 1 ), . . . , B n (x n ) are non-empty negative blocks, and n is maximal with these properties. By ǫ-splitting, we may derive C ∨ −q 1 ∨ . . . ∨ −q n and +q j ∨ B j (x j ) for every j, 1 ≤ j ≤ n, from such a clause, where q j = B j (x j ) . Call C ∨ −q 1 ∨ . . . ∨ −q n the splinter off C ∨ B 1 (x 1 ), . . . , B n (x n ), and the clauses +q j ∨ B j (x j ) the definitions of q j ; the q j symbols are the splitting symbols.
The plan of the proof is to show that if we can deduce any clause by white and light grey resolution, q-resolution and ǫ-splitting, then we can deduce its splinter by using ivory resolution instead of light grey resolution. It suffices to show that for any rule in the first set, the rules in the second set can be applied to the splinters of the premises to derive the splinter of the conclusion. This is obvious for white resolution, since ǫ-splitting was already applied eagerly in this case, and also for ǫ-splitting. Let us consider the other rules:
• Light grey resolution. Writing the premises in the form C ∨ B 1 (x 1 ) ∨ . . . ∨ B n (x n ), either we resolve upon a literal in C, or we resolve upon a literal in some B i (x i ). This means we have the following possibilities. First case:
By induction hypothesis, we have derived C ∨ −q 1 ∨ . . . ∨ −q n ∨ −A and
n ′ by ivory resolution. This clause is, or ǫ-splits into the splinter off the conclusion
Third case: −A on the right is inside B i (x i ) for some i. By (iv) and the definition of sel, the only possibility is that the right premise is of type (4), say B(x) ∨ −P (x)[∨ + q], where B(x) is a block. Note that it is its own splinter. The left premise is
As before, we may infer a corresponding notion of oracle. Please note that, using the rules of Proposition 5, we now get out of grey zones, not by generating disjunctions of blocks B 1 (x 1 ) ∨ . . . ∨ B n (x n )[∨ + q], but by producing their splinters B 1 (x 1 ) ∨ −q 2 ∨ . . . ∨ −q n [∨ + q], plus definitions for splitting symbols. The latter include the symbols q 2 , . . . , q n but may contain others.
It is accessible from a set S of clauses of type (4), (5), or (6'), if and only if it is derivable from S by ivory resolution and q-resolution alone. A light grey oracle is any function O mapping every set of clauses of type (4), (5), or (6') to a set of light candidates containing those that are accessible from S.
Corollary 7 Let O be any light grey oracle. Under the assumptions of Proposition 1, white resolution and the light grey oracle rule: to S add O(S), are complete for every set of clauses of type (4), (5), or (6'). More precisely, for every set S 1 of clauses of type (4), (5), or (6'), if S 1 is unsatisfiable modulo E, then the empty clause can be derived from S 1 by white resolution and the light grey oracle rule. Moreover, completeness is retained when removing tautologies, forward subsumed clauses, and eagerly ǫ-splitting clauses.
This in particular applies to sets S 1 of flattened clauses obtained from sets S 0 describing Diffie-Hellman-like protocols (Section 3).
Finding a Light Grey Oracle
The main value of light grey oracles O, justifying that we did not stop our analysis of Section 4.4 after Corollary 3, is that the function mapping S to O(S 4,6 ′ ) is also a light grey oracle, where S 4,6 ′ is the subset of S containing just the clauses of type (4) and (6'). This is because the ivory resolution and q-resolution rules never apply to clauses of type (5).
Without loss of generality, let us therefore assume in this section that S is a set of clauses of type (4) and (6'). Note that all terms in such clauses are built on Σ: no symbol from Σ 0 occurs anywhere in S. In the case of the theory AC, this means that the only function symbol in S is ⊕.
To design a computable light grey oracle, fix a finite model M of the equational theory E on signature Σ. In the AC case, this is an arbitrary finite semigroup. In practice, we choose Z/nZ for some small value of n, typically n = 3.
Call M-instance of a clause of type (4) and (6') any clause obtaining by replacing each variable by an element of M, and simplifying. Formally, let ρ be an environment, i.e., a function mapping variables to elements of M, let x ρ = ρ(x) and g(t 1 , . . . , t n ) ρ = M g ( t 1 ρ, . . . , t n ρ), where M g is some n-ary function (e.g., addition modulo n). Now let P (t) ρ be the formal atom P ( t ρ) for every atom P (t); we call this an M-atom. Similarly, define the M-literal ±P (t) ρ = ±P ( t ρ), and the M-clause
Our light grey oracle consists in simulating ivory resolution and q-resolution at the level of M-instances.
To start off, we use an M-instantiation rule: from any clause C in S, add all M-instances of C to S. Then, we simulate ivory resolution and q-resolution by the propositional version of resolution on M-instances (without any ordering or selection function):
Lemma 8 Given a set ES of M-clauses, let Res 0 (ES) be the set of all clauses deducible from ES by binary propositional resolution. Let S be any set of clauses of type (4) or (6'), M(S) the set of its M-instances, and Res(S) be the set of clauses deducible from S by ivory resolution and q-resolution. Then M(Res(S)) ⊆ Res 0 (M(S)). This is immediate. Simulating ǫ-splitting at the level of M-instances is more complicated. Notice that the set of M-instances of C ∨ −P 1 (x) ∨ . . . ∨ −P n (x), where x is not free in C, is exactly the set of M-clauses
, where C 0 ranges over the M-instances of C and k ranges over M. So let us consider the following abstract splitting rule
where q = −P 1 (x) ∨ . . . ∨ −P m (x) , m ≥ 1, and C 0 is not empty. This reads as follows: if, given a set S of M-clauses and clauses of type (4), (5), or (6'), S contains all the M-clauses
, for some predicates P 1 , . . . , P m , then add the M-clause C 0 ∨ −q and the definition of the splitting symbol q to S.
Finally, we simulate the generation
of fat dot clauses at the exit of grey zones (i.e., of light candidates) using the same idea: this is rule (Exit) at the right, where B(x) is any block.
We get the following immediate extension of Lemma 8.
Lemma 9 Let S be any set of M-clauses and clauses of type (4), (5), or (6'). Let S |M the subset of M-clauses.
Let Ded 0 (S) be the set of all clauses and M-clauses deducible by binary proposition resolution between M-clauses and by the (ASplit) and (Exit) rules. Let Ded(S) = Res(S |M ).
If S |M contains M(S 4,6 ′ ), then M(Ded(S)) ⊆ Ded 0 (S). Moreover, for every light candidate C accessible from S 4,6 ′ , C is in Ded 0 (S).
Proposition 10 If M is a finite model of E on signature Σ, then the function O std mapping any set of clauses of type (4), (5), or (6') to the set of light candidates in Ded 0 (S ∪ M(S)) is a computable light grey oracle.
Implementing the Light Grey Oracle
The only remaining challenge now is to implement the light grey oracle O std of Proposition 10 efficiently.
Let us consider the easier rule (Exit) first. To handle it, we use a table Tab Exit , mapping clauses to natural numbers. We maintain the invariant that for each clause C of the form ± 1 P 1 (x) ∨ . . . ∨ ± m P m (x) ∨ −q 2 ∨ . . . ∨ −q n [∨ + q] (i.e., those that may be the conclusion of (Exit)), Tab Exit (C) is the number of Minstances of C that are present in the current clause set S. Note here that C is not limited to be a clause in S: C is arbitrary.
This invariant is maintained as follows. Initially, Tab Exit is empty, i.e., it maps every clause to 0. For each newly-generated M-clause in the current clause set S (by M-instantiation, or by binary propositional resolution), first check that it is of the form ± 1 P 1 (k) ∨ . . . ∨ ± m P m (k) ∨ −q 2 ∨ . . . ∨ −q n [∨ + q], with the same value k as argument to all predicates P 1 , . . . , P m . If it is of this form, then generate the skeleton clause C = ± 1 P 1 (x) ∨ . . . ∨ ± m P m (x) ∨ −q 2 ∨ . . . ∨ −q n [∨ + q], and add 1 to Tab Exit (C). Notice that this is only correct provided that ± 1 P 1 (k) ∨ . . . ∨ ± m P m (k) ∨ −q 2 ∨ . . . ∨ −q n [∨ + q] is indeed new, i.e., was not already present in S. This is handled by the subsumption engine. Now, (Exit) is implemented by producing the clause C as soon as Tab Exit (C) reaches n, the cardinality of M: (Exit) is as easy as using a table and counting.
The case of (ASplit) is slightly trickier. As above, create a table Tab ASplit mapping pairs (C 0 , −P 1 (x) ∨ . . . ∨ −P m (x)) of a non-empty M-clause C 0 and a non-empty negative block −P 1 (x) ∨ . . . ∨ −P m (x) to natural numbers. The invariant is that Tab ASplit (C 0 , −P 1 (x) ∨ . . . ∨ −P m (x)) is the number of Mclauses of the form C 0 ∨ −P 1 (k) ∨ . . . ∨ −P m (k), k ∈ M, in the current clause set S. Initially, Tab ASplit is empty. For each newly-generated M-clause C in the current clause set S, if C is not empty then it contains some literal −P 1 (k), k ∈ M. For every such k, write C as C 0 ∨ −P 1 (k) ∨ . . . ∨ −P m (k), where m ≥ 1 is maximal. Then, for every pair (B, B ′ ) of subsets of {P 1 , . . . , P m } such that B is not empty, not both B For example, starting from C = −P (2) ∨ −Q(1) ∨ −R(1), we get C 0 = −P (2) if we choose k = 1, then we add one to the entry for the pair (−P (2), −Q(x) ∨ −R(x)). This is the most obvious case, and we get back C by taking the disjunction of −P (2) with the M-instance obtained from −Q(x) ∨ −R(x) by taking x = 1. We also add one, e.g., to the entry (−P (2) ∨ −Q(1), −R(x)), corresponding to the fact that C is also the disjunction of −P (2) ∨ −Q(1) with the M-instance −R(1) of −R(x). We also add one to the entry for (−P (2) ∨ −Q(1), −Q(x) ∨ −R(x)): the corresponding M-instance is −P (2) ∨ −Q(1) ∨ −Q(1) ∨ −R(1), which is C again, since the two −Q(1)'s merge.
Finally, when Tab ASplit (C 0 , −P 1 (x) ∨ . . . ∨ −P m (x)) reaches n, we just add the corresponding conclusions C 0 ∨−q and +q∨−P 1 (x)∨. . .∨−P m (x)) of (ASplit) to the current clause set S, where q = −P 1 (x) ∨ . . . ∨ −P m (x) .
This was implemented as part of the MOP modular platform for automated theorem proving (Roger, 2003) .
Running MOP on the Group Diffie-Hellman Protocol
We have already seen how to formalize the group Diffie-Hellman protocol with a fixed number of principals in Section 3.2, using an associative-commutative primitive ⊕, a unary function symbol e and a constant 0. Running MOP with a light grey oracle on Z/3Z, we get the statistics shown in Figure 2 for the case with two principals, in Figure 3 for three principals, in Figure 4 for four principals. Experiments were conducted on a 1.4 GHz Intel-class machine with 512 Mb memory and 256 Kb cache memory, running Linux 2.4.3-20. MOP is written in OCaml 3. Note that the code was not especially optimized; notably, all hash tables are actually implemented as association lists, and subsumption tests do not use any indexing technique.
In the copycat and Dolev-Yao models, we retrieve the standard attack (Millen and Denker, 2002) . More interestingly, MOP shows that IKA.1 is secure in the pure eavesdropper model, which was after all the only model it was designed for (Steiner et al., 2000) . As far as we know, this is the first completely automated proof of this fact. (The proof by Pereira and Quisquater (2001) is by hand.) This verifies IKA.1 assuming that ⊕ is associative and commutative, but it would be more realistic to consider that ⊕ is an Abelian group law. So take Σ to consist of ⊕ and another, unary symbol ⊖ (opposite), and E be the exponential of k already. One particularly good news is that, although the light grey oracle rules may seem unwieldy, they are efficient enough in practice, and the number of clauses generated by the light grey oracle is in fact small. But n must be kept low: with n = 3, already 45-75% of all generated clauses are Z/nZ-instances.
Conclusion
We have shown how cryptographic protocols using Diffie-Hellman primitives, i.e., modular exponentiation on a fixed generator, can be encoded in Horn clauses modulo associativity and commutativity. In order to obtain a sufficient criterion of security, we have designed a complete (but not sound in general) resolution procedure for a class of flattened clauses modulo simple equational theories, including associativity-commutativity. This provides a sound abstraction of the initial protocol. More than that: our techniques provide a sufficient criterion of satisfiability for the undecidable class of alternating two-way ACtree automata (Goubault-Larrecq and Verma, 2002) .
The second author has implementated this algorithm in the MOP modular platform for automated proving. While the number of clauses representing the protocol already grows exponentially fast with the number of participants, this works well enough for small numbers of participants. The core of our resolution procedure consists in light grey oracle rules, which, together with white resolution, are complete; this was the hard technical point of the paper. Finding a light grey oracle, although seemingly hard, turned out to be feasible using fairly simple hashing and counting mechanisms. While our light grey oracle might seem unwieldy as far as complexity is concerned, experience proves otherwise: it is efficient enough and does not generate that many clauses.
As a final note, we stress that we have obtained the first fully automated proof of security of the IKA.1 initial key agreement protocol in the pure eavesdropper model, the model it was designed to work in (Steiner et al., 2000) .
